By: Dewan Alif Ovi | October 16, 2025
Introduction
On 20 June 2025, Bangladesh officially ratified the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (the 1992 “Water Convention”), marking its status as the first country in South Asia and the 56th worldwide to become a party to this treaty. In order to maintain long-term water security, the government sees this as a reaction to three pressing issues: population increase, climate change, and growing water demand. As the Environment Adviser of Bangladesh, Syeda Rizwana Hasan, points out, these issues “require enhanced transboundary cooperation.”
Bangladesh’s own statements highlight the significance of the situation; it has 57 international rivers (including the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna basin) on which “water security, the environment and even political stability are highly interdependent.” Reports suggest that the rise in sea levels, salinity intrusion, and the fact that some 65 million people in Bangladesh still don’t have access to safely managed sanitation facilities show how important it is to have fair and sustainable water governance. Against this backdrop, joining a multilateral water agreement signifies a progressive change in Bangladesh’s approach – one that connects concrete data on water flows and shortages to a legally established, collaborative framework for managing rivers.
Transboundary Water Politics in South Asia
Bangladesh occupies a position as a country located at the lower end of shared rivers within a multifaceted network of international rivers, the majority of which have their sources in India, Nepal, Bhutan, and China. Bangladesh is on the receiving side of the major rivers of South Asia – the rivers start in the Himalayan ranges of India, Nepal, Bhutan and China and then move southwards through the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin before draining into the Bangladeshi land. The geographical characteristics of the country significantly amplify its reliance on external sources; it constitutes merely 7–8% of the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) basin area while obtaining approximately 92.5% of its surface water from beyond its borders. Among the approximately 230 rivers in Bangladesh, 57 are classified as transboundary, with 54 shared with India and 3 with Myanmar.
Notably, certain rivers transport substantial sediment loads, delivering around 2.4 billion tons of sediment like sand, clay and silt each year from the Himalayas. During the dry season, it is observed that “most of the rivers remain dried up,” rendering any upstream withdrawal or blockade a major source of tension. For instance, numerous years of upstream water management have reshaped Bangladesh’s rivers and water flows. The Farakka Barrage in India, operational since 1975 and constructed to divert the Ganges for irrigation purposes, is perceived in Bangladesh as a key reason for shrinking dry-season flows. Experts assert that the Farakka Barrage is consistently regarded as a primary cause of water scarcity in Bangladesh. Despite the stipulations of the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty, which regulates the operations of Farakka, Bangladesh did not get its share as promised in the Ganges treaty during the dry season, and received less after the construction of Farakka. Climate Diplomacy, a respected research institution, notes that India frequently utilizes the treaty’s minimum guarantees to “solidify the status quo,” leading to significant flooding during the monsoon and acute droughts in the lean season for Bangladesh.
Southern Bangladesh exhibits significant susceptibility to the impacts of climate change. Analysts from the World Bank have classified Bangladesh as one of the nation’s most vulnerable to climate risks, highlighting that approximately two-thirds of the country is situated below five meters above sea level. The densely populated delta is experiencing significant shrinkage due to the impacts of sea-level rise and storm surges. The embedded photo of an eroding riverbank in rural Bangladesh serves as a poignant illustration of a significant consequence: the destabilization of once-reliable embankments, which now pose a threat to both residences and agricultural land. Coastal lands are experiencing inundation due to seasonal cyclones and salinity intrusion, while inland regions are facing extreme floods exacerbated by compromised river systems. The cumulative effects of these factors exacerbate the challenges associated with water sharing, particularly in light of upstream diversions and dam construction in India and Bhutan.
China’s actions also contribute to the intensification of local droughts in Bangladesh and amplify the severity of floods during the monsoon season. Negotiations between India and Bangladesh have resulted in a limited number of water agreements. The 1996 Ganges Treaty, along with the preceding agreement of 1977 and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of 1982, serves as the central framework for regulating water flows at Farakka during the dry season from January to May.
However, several significant rivers do not have established agreements. The Teesta River, which is crucial for northwestern Bangladesh, currently lacks a conclusive treaty. A proposed agreement on the sharing of the Teesta, which was negotiated around 2011, ultimately collapsed due to political disagreements. Today, Bangladesh only receives sporadic water releases from Indian dams, significantly below its historical requirements. At one specific measuring station, the average flow of the Teesta during peak season is recorded at 7,900 m³/s, in stark contrast to a mere 283 m³/s during the lean season.
In 2022, a notable development occurred when the two nations entered into an interim agreement regarding the sharing of the Kushiyara river, marking the first water-sharing accord since 1996. However, the majority of the smaller transboundary rivers in Bangladesh, such as the Gumti, Monu, and Muhuri, lack comprehensive treaties governing their use and management. It is striking that despite sharing 54 rivers, India and Bangladesh have succeeded in formalizing merely a single agreement over the span of nearly 25 years. In short, South Asia is characterized by the absence of a comprehensive regional framework for water management, and conflicts are addressed on a bilateral basis (frequently in a unilateral manner) without any supranational governance or enforceable multilateral mechanisms.
Why Bangladesh Joined: Strategic and Legal Rationale
Bangladesh’s participation in the 1997 Water Convention serves a mix of strategic, legal, and developmental purposes. Joining helps Bangladesh’s efforts to get a fair share of water resources within an established international framework, which makes it easier for the country to make its claims. Official documents describe Bangladesh’s accession as a strategic diplomatic shift toward multilateralism and international law, highlighting that the Convention provides binding rules, transparent data exchange and joint‑monitoring mechanisms. Stakeholders across government, academia and civil society supported the move because it grants Bangladesh international legal leverage, technical support and a cooperative platform to strengthen national water governance and encourage basin‑wide cooperation. This approach makes fair water sharing a legal right, based on the treaty, rather than a mere concession between two countries. Because of the problems that climate change and population growth bring, like changing water patterns and rising resource demands, make the need for cooperation across borders even clearer.
The Convention also strengthens Bangladesh’s commitment to achieving SDG 6, which is about clean water and sanitation, and encourages sustainable development. This aligns with the country’s main goals of making the environment more resilient and following international laws. International groups have backed up this argument: in the context of climate stress, the Executive Secretary of UNECE praised Bangladesh’s membership as “a significant move for South Asia,” and “a critical instrument for strengthening cross-border water cooperation.” Sonja Koeppel, Secretary of the UN Water Convention, congratulated Bangladesh and encouraged other South Asian nations to get involved as well. The UN Secretary-General has encouraged all member states to join and implement the convention as well.
From Bangladesh’s perspective, accession is a smart way to do legal diplomacy. Bangladesh can now back up future claims with the legitimacy that a treaty grants. This creates additional avenues for funding and technical help and strengthens its negotiating position with upstream countries. Additionally, this aligns with a foreign policy agenda that prioritizes multilateral cooperation. Leaders in Bangladesh see this program as a way of enhancing the country’s water management capacities, even if the exact domestic costs associated with the new legislation and data systems have not yet been established. This includes access to the Convention’s advisory Implementation Committee and the knowledge that goes along with it.
Strategic Gains and Structural Hurdles
As a signatory to the United Nations Water Convention, Bangladesh is better able to use diplomatic and legal channels to promote equitable transboundary water management. Bangladesh no longer must rely solely on bilateral diplomacy; as a treaty member, it can now use fundamental international principles like “equitable and reasonable utilization” and the duty to prevent “significant harm” to express its demands in multilateral, legally grounded terms. Sharing data, providing advance notice, and establishing collaborative river basin commissions are among approaches that the Convention strongly supports. Bangladesh may argue for similar partnerships in the South Asian setting by looking at international examples like the Rhine and Mekong frameworks. Negotiation, mediation, arbitration (with mutual consent), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are all formally established dispute settlement procedures under the Convention. Invoking these measures can amplify diplomatic pressure and intensify the reputational consequences caused by non-cooperation, even if India and its bordering nations are not parties to the Convention.
As a member, Bangladesh is able to participate in global forums, apply for technical help, and gain goodwill from donors, all of which might improve its position in regional and international forums. Many geopolitical and pragmatic considerations, however, restrict the Convention’s applicability. India, Nepal, Bhutan, and China are important co-riparians, which have not acceded to the agreement. Yet the treaty is legally binding only on the states that have signed it, such as Bangladesh. As a result, disputes about the Ganges or Teesta, which are very contentious, cannot be unilaterally addressed by Bangladesh without consulting other parties. The Convention also cannot be used to address long-standing problems like the Farakka Barrage since it does not have retroactive applicability.
Bangladesh’s signing the UN Water Convention is a big step toward setting up an international system for water diplomacy based on recognized legal standards. By being the first South Asian Country to ratify the Convention, Bangladesh showed that it is committed to fair river management and strengthened its position as a legitimate player in debates over transboundary water issues. The Convention may not completely end long-standing disagreements in the region, but it gives people a strong reason to work together and promote openness, responsibility, and international cooperation in a place that has never had these kinds of rules before.
Dewan Alif Ovi is a South Asia Foundation (SAF) scholar, independent researcher, columnist, and human rights activist. He completed his LL. B and LL.M from the University of Asia Pacific, Bangladesh. He is a former Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Genocide and Justice (CSGJ) at the Liberation War Museum, Dhaka. Currently, he is serving as a Research Associate at Jurists Chambers.