Himani Jha | December 2, 2025
On October 3, 2025, a Finnish court ruled that Finland’s authorities lacked jurisdiction over the Eagle S’s crew for damage caused to the undersea cables last December, finding that the damage occurred outside Finland’s territorial jurisdiction even though it was within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The decision has major implications for international and maritime law as it exposes a jurisdictional gap concerning undersea cables, which mostly lie outside the territorial waters of any state. In the present case, the Cook Islands-flagged tanker Eagle S reportedly dragged its anchor for around 90 km in the gulf of Finland, damaging one power transmission cable and four telecommunications cables.
The damage disrupted Finland’s energy transmission capacity and posed a serious threat to its energy and telecommunication infrastructure. The court, however, ruled that since the damage occurred outside the territorial waters of Finland, Finnish laws would not apply and that legal authority lies instead with the flag state of the vessel or with the States whose nationals were on the crew. Moreover, the prosecution failed to demonstrate aggravated criminal mischief and the court found technical negligence on part of the crew rather than intentional wrongdoing. The case demonstrates a recurring concern that reliance based solely on flag-state jurisdiction, as per The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is ill-suited to the realities of undersea infrastructure. This post argues that there is a gap to be filled in regards to administration of Undersea cables in EEZs and on the High seas, and that a new internationally recognized way of attributing responsibility to such damages beyond UNCLOS needs to emerge.
A Rising Pattern of Undersea Vulnerability
The Finnish court’s reasoning echoes a series of recent cases in which states found themselves unable to act against serious harm to their undersea infrastructure. For instance, no state could assert comprehensive jurisdiction after the 2022 Nord Stream sabotage, in which explosions damaged pipelines in the Baltic Sea, as the pipelines crossed multiple EEZs and territorial seas. Similarly, Estonia and Finland faced similar legal constraints when China failed to cooperate regarding the Balticonnector damage incident in 2023 where a gas pipeline and telecom cables connecting Finland and Estonia were damaged, allegedly by the Chinese-owned vessel NewNew Polar Bear. Another similar incident occurred when Taiwan faced jurisdictional limits in pursuing remedies after two undersea internet cables were cut, reportedly by Chinese fishing vessels near its Matsu Islands, which caused a complete outage of internet and communication services on the Matsu Islands. Each incident highlights the same weakness, forming a pattern of affected states being left without effective recourse or remedy when critical infrastructure is damaged beyond their territorial seas.
The outcome of these incidents are troubling because affected states’ are unable to respond effectively, even when facing direct economic and security consequences. This represents a jurisdictional gap in UNCLOS which gives coastal states sovereign rights in their EEZs for resource exploitation, energy production, and marine research, but not full sovereignty. Jurisdiction in the EEZ is carefully circumscribed, especially in relation to foreign vessels. Article 97 explicitly gives criminal jurisdiction over navigational incidents on the high seas to the flag state or the state of nationality of the person involved. Similarly, Article 113 may require states to criminalize the willful or negligent breaking of submarine cables, but leaves enforcement to the flag state or the state of nationality.
Crude oil tanker Eagle S, Svartbäck anchoring site, Porvoo, Finland. CC BY-SA 4.0
There is no legal way to establish a jurisdictional nexus between the vessel and the state that suffered the consequences of an undersea cable damage. It is also important to note that many vessels fly under the flags of convenience. This means they are registered under states with limited enforcement capacity and little incentive to prosecute offences committed far from their own shores. Even capable flag states may hesitate to prosecute foreign-owned ships, particularly due to their own geopolitical considerations which they may be unwilling to confront. Moreover, without cooperation from the flag state, evidence gathering also becomes a great task. In practice, therefore, reliance on the flag state principle often translates into impunity.
An especially troubling dimension of the Eagle S episode lies in the persistent suspicion that the damage was not merely accidental but part of a deliberate pattern targeting critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic sea. Finnish investigators traced the anchor drag trail across the cables following the vessel’s route from the Russian port of Ust-Luga. These circumstances have invited speculation about intentional sabotage connected to Russia’s shadow fleet. Although the Finnish court dismissed the charges for lack of jurisdiction, the factual pattern when coupled with the vessel’s opaque ownership and registration raises legitimate concerns about strategic manipulation of legal ambiguity at sea. Importantly, this is not an isolated concern. The 2022 Nord Stream explosions, the 2023 Balticconnector pipeline rupture, and other similar disruptions expose how deliberate or hybrid operations exploit the jurisdictional voids of UNCLOS.
Undersea infrastructure has also been at the center of recent scholarly discourse with scholars highlighting how explosions in international waters (or EEZs) complicate claims of jurisdiction under jus ad bellum. At the same time there are also growing discussions on treating submarine infrastructure under the same logic as environmental protections of the high seas. Taken together, these discussions suggest a growing recognition that undersea infrastructure is no longer peripheral to international security but has become central to it and that international law must evolve accordingly.
Filling the Jurisdictional Gap Through a New Framework
The vulnerabilities exposed by Eagle S and similar incidents suggest that it is time for international law to adapt to these emerging realities. A new treaty regime, or a new protocol to UNCLOS, could provide the necessary reforms. At minimum, such a framework should establish first, a doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction wherein the state whose infrastructure is damaged shares jurisdiction with the flag state. This would allow the affected state to investigate and prosecute offences directly, rather than depending entirely upon the flag state’s willingness.
Second, the framework should include developing an internationally recognized, agreed-upon investigative mechanism specifically for undersea infrastructure damage. This specialized body, either independent or operating under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or UNCLOS frameworks, should be able to coordinate investigations, preserve evidence, and attribute responsibility in line with standardized procedures on data collection from vessels, cable operators, and coastal states. Inspiration can be taken from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which conducts impartial investigations under Annex 13 following air accidents. This would mirror how aviation investigations, from Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 to Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, balance sovereignty with transparency. That balance is notably missing in maritime incidents such as the recent Eagle S episode.
Third, a strict liability regime could ensure that operators are financially responsible for damage caused by their vessels, regardless of intent. Such a compensation mechanism could draw inspiration from the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Funds established under the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. These funds provide for collective compensation for pollution damage in case the shipowners’ liability limits are exceeded to ensure that the victims are not left uncompensated. A parallel Undersea Infrastructure Compensation Fund could be developed based on similar principles. It could be financed by vessel contributions and managed independently, or jointly under the IMO and UNCLOS framework, to provide compensation for undersea damage with transboundary impacts.
Last, such vessels could be required to adopt technical safeguards, such as mandatory anchor monitoring systems and restricted navigation zones near cables, whose compliance should be strictly overseen. This preventive framework could draw from existing maritime regimes like the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions, which mandate technical safeguards such as electronic navigation systems and equipment standards designed specifically to mitigate risks at sea. Comparable mechanisms also exist in the International Cable Protection Committee’s (ICPC) guidelines which establish cable awareness zones and prescribe operational conduct near critical undersea infrastructure. Moreover, additional steps could be taken such as mandatory integration of such obligations into national maritime safety regulations to align with established global maritime practices. Such reforms would effectively deter negligence and enhance resilience against intentional sabotage.
Addressing the Counterarguments
Sceptics may argue that expanding jurisdiction would violate the principle of freedom of the high seas or undermine the delicate balance of rights in the EEZ. Yet the proposed reforms do not entail full sovereignty over the EEZ. They merely ensure that when a state’s critical infrastructure is damaged, it can pursue accountability. This is consistent with broader trends in international law that prioritize protecting the global commons and shared infrastructure, such as environmental treaties and aviation safety regimes. Another argument is that enforcement burdens on multiple states may complicate implementation. However, the proposed concurrent jurisdiction would not eliminate flag-state jurisdiction but supplement it. States could still rely on mutual legal assistance and extradition mechanisms, ensuring that prosecutions are fair and coordinated to ensure accountability at sea.
The dismissal of the charges in the Eagle S case is a critical wake-up call. As our societies become ever more dependent on submarine cables and pipelines, carrying the very lifeblood of digital economies, international law must adapt to the newer challenges of the modern age. If the law continues to rely on the flag-state principle alone, accountability will remain elusive and ambiguous, while the costs of disruption will be borne by states and their citizens. A treaty recognizing concurrent jurisdiction, backed by international investigative mechanisms and liability regimes, would not eliminate all risks but it would close a glaring legal loophole. Such a framework would mark meaningful progress toward maritime accountability, ensuring accountability on and underneath the high seas. In a time when undersea cables are as vital as airways or satellites, the law must do no less than protect them.
Himani Jha is an LLM candidate at West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences specialising in International and Comparative law and an advocate at the Delhi District and High Courts, India. She completed her Bachelor’s in Arts and Law from University School of Law and Legal Studies, GGSIP University.