Skyline of Taipei, Taiwan viewed from Mount Elephant on June 29, 2022. CC BY-SA 2.0

Jordan Jang | January 18, 2026

Introduction: 

With a year of the Trump administration behind us, the United States remains involved in a variety of international conflicts. Under Trump, America’s stance on protecting allies in need is increasingly difficult to surmise. The executive is generally given substantial discretion in matters of foreign affairs under Article II of the Constitution, as held in  US v Curtis-Wright. Yet as Youngstown Sheet makes clear, such discretion is limited when Congress has enacted a statute guiding the President or restricting their power to act. 

Back in 1979, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China while maintaining informal ties with Taiwan. Before Trump was inaugurated in December 2024, he was asked: “If China invades Taiwan on your watch, are you committed to defending Taiwan?” His response: “I never say, because I have to negotiate things, right?  

This raises the question, under an administration that prioritizes negotiations over traditional alliances, does the TRA impose any constraint if the President declines to act in support of Taiwan? In theory, Congress may have significant leverage over U.S.-Taiwan relations under the TRA; however, Congress’s power is limited particularly when what is at issue is not presidential overreach but presidential inaction. 

Analysis of the TRA: 

The TRA includes provisions stating that “it is the policy of the United States:

(1) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means 

(2) shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and 

(3) shall maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan and 

(4) President and the Congress shall determine the appropriate action in response to any such danger [against Taiwan].”

Any plain reading of the statute fails to guarantee any U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. There is no binding language requiring the United States “shall” intervene to defend Taiwan. Rather, the only binding language states the U.S. “shall provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” yet any aggression towards Taiwan is merely a “grave concern to the United States.” Any non-peaceful action against Taiwan are only “considered threats” and provides no mechanism that would require either executive or Congressional action upon coercion, embargoes, or boycotts. 

The TRA does require Congress to act along with the President when determining the “sufficient self-defense capacity” of Taiwan. Further, both the President and the Congress shall determine appropriate action if any danger is posed against Taiwan. But again, this language only invites taking “appropriate action” and does not bind the U.S. to act. “Appropriate action” could include not taking any action depending on the circumstances. 

Due to the informal status of Taiwan, the TRA is not actually a treaty, but a law that binds U.S. policy as to Taiwan. The TRA can be compared to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and South Korea, that “declares” both parties must “act to meet the common danger” in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control of the other.” 

In fact, the TRA was drafted with the purpose of reflecting strategic ambiguity, offering guidance but no commitment. This enables the U.S. to more flexibly engage with Taiwan while maintaining relations with the People’s Republic of China. Thus, despite Congress’s attempt at curtailing the executive’s powers via the TRA, “strategic ambiguity” gives much discretion to the president in approaching US relations with Taiwan even if the Youngstown framework is applied. 

Applying the Youngstown Framework:

The scope of executive action is subject to the Youngstown framework, which divides presidential authority into three categories: 

(1) Maximum authority for acting “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,” 

(2) A “zone of twilight [where] any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables,” 

(3) At the “lowest ebb” or actions “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” 

Congressional action, such as passing a statute like the TRA, either grants the President maximum authority, or places his actions in the “lowest ebb.” However, the TRA’s deliberate strategic ambiguity instead places the President’s authority in the “zone of twilight” where both the President and Congress retain concurrent authority, and the distribution of power is uncertain. In this “zone of twilight,” the balance leans in favor of the President because “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.” In other words, Congress’s silence gives the President great discretion. And even if there is any danger, Congress alone cannot direct action as both “the President and the Congress shall determine” appropriate action in response to danger. 

Thus, U.S.-Taiwan relations with respect to the Taiwan Relations Act remains in the “zone of twilight” because it authorizes U.S. support of Taiwan, but the execution of any U.S. action is subject to the executive’s discretion “depending on the imperative of events and contemporary imponderables.” Applying the Youngstown framework against the executive’s actions provides little clarity, because the TRA falls within the “zone of twilight” giving the executive branch significant discretion in approaching relations with Taiwan. 

Trump’s Stance on Taiwan: 

Trump’s “America First” policy emphasizes bargaining and transactional relationships with allies, demanding allies allocate a greater share of the costs regardless of circumstances. For example, contrasted to Biden’s ‘unconditional’ support of Ukraine, Trump’s stance was recently conveyed in a $11.1 billion weapons deal with Taiwan. In other words, Trump favors a cost‑sharing, economic, power-based framework over the Biden administration’s more unconditional and tradition-driven emphasis on supporting democracies. 

Previously, Trump has specifically stated he wants Taiwan to increase its spending on military to 10% of overall GDP.  When asked in February 2025 whether it was Trump’s policy that China would “never take Taiwan by force” during his presidency, Trump responded, “I never comment on that,” adding, “I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.” This statement illustrates Trump’s ambiguity and America’s return to strategic ambiguity following the Biden administration. 

Conclusion

Here lies the problem: Trump’s position pertaining to US-Taiwan relations does not explicitly violate the statute. 

Trump’s stance does not violate the TRA because the statute does not require the United States to defend Taiwan, and presidential inaction could entirely fall within the bounds of the statute. It is not to say the TRA is without bite: it is still the governing statute behind US-Taiwan relations that authorized the recent $11.1 billion weapons sales to Taiwan and demands the U.S. maintains its military in any event that jeopardizes the security of Taiwan. 

But as emphasized, the TRA imposes no actionable duty like that of a treaty, nor does it provide enforceable language under a Youngstown analysis that directs executive action. Under the “zone of twilight,” presidential discretion is at its peak because Congress deliberately chose to maintain strategic ambiguity when drafting the TRA. As a result, under a Trump administration committed to transactional relationships over traditional factors, the TRA provides no recourse for Congress in the event Trump fails to respect the U.S.-Taiwan alliance. Ultimately, the TRA’s strategic ambiguity grants significant discretion to the president, leaving Taiwan-U.S. security, social, and economic matters in the hands of one man.