Legal Analysis of the Venezuela Raid and Capture of Nicolas Maduro

U.S. Air Force crew chiefs watch as F-35A Lightning II’s taxi following military actions in Venezuela in support of Operation Absolute Resolve, Jan. 3, 2026. (U.S. Air Force Photo)

Ashley Toledo | February 22, 2026

In the early morning hours of January 3, 2026, American social media and news outlet subscriptions surged with startling information: “U.S. captures Maduro from his home.” This blog will examine the arguments and potential defenses both supporting and opposing the lawfulness of this action. Was the extradition of Venezuela’s president legal? Also, what did the U.S have to gain from this extradition?

History of Venezuela’s Bolivarian leadership 

The Bolivarian movement, initiated by Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, established a government focused on improving the lives of the country’s impoverished population, which constitutes approximately 80% of Venezuelans. This form of socialism prioritizes social welfare policies, including adult literacy, education, and basic healthcare. The revolution served as a response to U.S. economic imperialism, advocating for Venezuelan sovereignty over its economy and a more equitable distribution of oil revenues to fund these social programs.

In 2012, Chávez appointed Maduro as vice president. Before this, Maduro was a bus driver who became involved in labor organizing, which helped raise his political profile. In 2013, Maduro was sworn in as president. With around 303 billion barrels of oil reserves, Venezuela is a key player in the global energy market, significantly influencing supply chains in the Western Hemisphere.

Monroe Doctrine

Trump expresses his support for the operation by referencing a longstanding doctrine from the past. Defenders of this operation turn to the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine has been invoked by President Trump to justify recent military action against Nicolás Maduro’s government, framing it as removing foreign adversaries and protecting U.S. interests.

In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was established by President James Monroe, who declared the Western Hemisphere closed to new European colonization and interference, with the U.S. promising to refrain from interfering in European affairs.

The United States is building on this historic legacy and defending its current actions by employing a self-defense theory, asserting that it is trying to stop cartel activity and deaths from drugs in the United States. The U.S claims that it is in an armed conflict with Venezuela’s leader. The US justifies its conflict with Venezuela by citing regime discontent and drug-related offenses.

Global Criticism

The U.S. military’s extraction of Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro has sparked global legal controversy. Many states and international organizations argue that this action violates the core principles of sovereignty and the U.N. Charter. The U.N. Charter stipulates that states must not use force in another state’s territory except under limited circumstances, typically requiring U.N. Security Council authorization or self-defense following an armed attack. Legal experts have noted that these conditions were not met in this case. 

The UN Charter, specifically Article 2(4), prohibits the use of force against the sovereignty of other nations, a principle that has become customary in international law. The Charter recognizes two exceptions to this rule: the first is when authorization is granted by the Security Council, which was not the case here. The second exception pertains to the right to self-defense in response to an armed attack, as outlined in Article 51. The Trump administration is attempting to invoke this exception by designating the Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization in November 2025 and asserting that Maduto serves as its leader.

Drug trafficking is unlikely to serve as grounds for self-defense under international law because there is no evidence that Venezuela planned to use military action against the United States. However, the White House is linking the operation to the fentanyl-related deaths in the U.S. In contrast, world leaders and international actors believe that the conditions were not met to justify this as self-defense under international law.

Some of the most influential geopolitical players in the international community were strongly opposed to the  U.S. action in Venezuela. China described the operation as illegal and a violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty, citing a violation of the UN Charter, and called for the immediate release of Maduro. On January 5th, spokesperson Lin Jian expressed China’s concerns about international stability, and labeled the U.S. government’s actions a “clear violation of international law,” and urged for Maduro’s release.

Venezuela’s use of defense systems supplied by China and Russia means that the recent raid not only serves a tactical purpose for the United States but also projects US power by indicating that these governments and their supporters are unable to protect their allies from U.S. actions. This situation brings embarrassment to Beijing, illustrating the gap between China’s ambitions and its real influence in Latin America. Russia’s stance on President Maduro’s capture is in alignment with Beijing’s position, as indicated by a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry. The statement describes the actions of the U.S. as an “act of armed aggression” and calls for measures to prevent further escalation. Russian officials emphasized Venezuela’s right to sovereignty, calling for the South American nation to remain free from foreign interference. Additionally, Russia reaffirmed its solidarity with Venezuela’s “Bolivarian leadership.”

Was this operation really about oil?

While various theories exist regarding the motivations behind the US operation in Venezuela, such as addressing drug trafficking, curbing Venezuelan migration, or promoting democracy, benefiting the American oil industry has ultimately become the main justification cited by Trump.

However, a conflicting point is that experts in the oil industry have said they have no advanced knowledge or interest in investing in Venezuela’s oil reserves. Surprisingly, taking control of Venezuela’s oil reserves is not immediately lucrative. The majority of Venezuela’s crude is extra-heavy, meaning its thick consistency and high sulfur content make it more challenging to extract. Consequently, this type of oil typically commands a lower market price compared to lighter crude varieties.

For U.S. control of Venezuela’s oil reserves to yield economic returns, substantial investment and comprehensive restructuring of the Venezuelan oil sector would be required. Structural reforms would be necessary to attract the approximately $100 billion in capital that U.S. officials and industry experts indicate is needed to rehabilitate and modernize the country’s energy infrastructure.

As noted by Darren Woods, the CEO of Exxon, Venezuela is currently uninvestable due to the existing legal and commercial frameworks, making it a poor use of investment dollars.

What is the value of this operation? 

The Trump administration insists Maduro’s capture was a legal and strategically critical move against drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, intended to deter other world leaders involved in such activities. According to the administration, the U.S. stands to gain access to 30-50 million barrels of sanctioned Venezuelan oil, which will be sold at market price with the proceeds managed by the U.S. government. The Trump administration claims that this gain allows the U.S. to reroute current oil exports and reconfigure the use of oil as a strategic asset. Furthermore, the extraction of Maduro delivers a strong geopolitical message to major global adversaries, particularly China and Russia.

Legal Vulnerability

The legal vulnerability of the Trump administration’s arrangement regarding Venezuela’s oil revenue has two major issues: the recognition of the state and the authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The administration states that they are cooperating with the interim government led by Delcy Rodriguez. As of February 2026, Trump has publicly said the U.S. is recognizing Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s leader, even while the White House messaging has been somewhat inconsistent and has fluctuated. A few weeks before, the U.S. stated that it did not recognize Rodriguez’s government and instead recognized the opposition-led 2015 assembly as Venezuela’s legitimate representation. Since January 2019, Washington has viewed the Maduro-led system as lacking democratic legitimacy. It has instead recognized the opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly as the legitimate branch of Venezuela’s government. Congress has written into U.S. law a policy of recognizing that the Assembly is the only legitimate national legislative body. To navigate this challenge, the U.S. initially used Qatar as an intermediary third-party country to transfer funds into Venezuela. However, more recent reporting indicates that the funds are being held in a U.S. Treasury account rather than in Qatar. A central purpose for needing to involve a third country was to shield the funds from potential seizures.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s defense is that the U.S. is not confiscating funds but is instead holding sovereign property while releasing funds through sanctions and audit restrictions. The more the program resembles indefinite U.S. control and conditional spending of Venezuela’s oil revenues rather than the temporary blocking consistent with sanctions practice, the stronger the argument that it functionally exceeds the  IEEPA and conflicts with the administration’s own stated recognition posture. Venezuela’s acting president says she has had ‘enough’ of U.S. orders. Now, Rodríguez has pushed back against the U.S., claiming she has had enough of the intense pressure, including a series of demands from the U.S. that Venezuela resume oil production. “Enough already of Washington’s orders over politicians in Venezuela,” she told a group of oil workers in Puerto La Cruz city, a state-run channel, Venezolana de Televisión broadcast. Rodríguez stated that Venezuelan conflicts should be resolved internally and that this Republic has paid a very high price for having to confront the consequences of fascism and extremism. Therefore, the arrangement is legally vulnerable because it tries to exercise control over Venezuela’s sovereign oil revenues while at the same time the U.S. simultaneously takes an inconsistent recognition posture toward the interim leaders governing Venezuela, which includes Trump’s February 2026 statement that the U.S. recognizes Rodríguez, despite earlier contrary messaging.

Was it legal?

The legality of the incident is highly contested, and the answer depends on whether one examines it through international law or U.S. domestic law. There is no single “court ruling,” yet that definitively settles it this way. Many prominent legal assessments say it was illegal, while the U.S. argues self-defense. The arguments made by the United States are legally contested as the operation’s legality depends on contested claims of self-defense and authority, rather than on any widely accepted legal basis under international law. Furthermore, the legal framework relies on maintaining a challenging balance between control, systematic coordination, and formal recognition. As long as the United States attempts to influence the management of Venezuela’s oil revenues while its recognition of the country’s leadership remains inconsistent, the operation will continue to face significant scrutiny under broader principles of sovereignty in international law.