Narek Abgaryan & Davit Khachatryan | November 12, 2025
Deal or No Deal? The Hidden Reef in the Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace Text
Months after the Ministries of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the text of the Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations Between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan had been finalized, high-level delegations from the two war-torn states were on their way to Washington, D.C., to initial the document under the patronage of President Trump. While there are concerns over whether the treaty will be ratified, this is a serious first step toward the finalization of the procedure in the upcoming years, and the presence of a “Big boss” as a witness is lowering the opportunities to maneuver.
The Agreement is more intricate than it first appears. While the text of the treaty consists of just 17 articles, almost every article raises significant questions stemming from national legislation or international law perspectives. As it’s almost impossible to analyze the entirety of The Agreement in just one solitary blog post, the core focus of this post will be analyzing Articles XIV and XV.
While the treaty is designed to bring peace to the two conflicting states, and the region as a whole, a cornerstone question remains: whether peace can be achieved through sacrificing justice and refraining from bringing legal disputes to international judicial bodies. This is not a mere philosophical question; international jurisprudence offers effective tests. .
National and International Dimensions
From a legal perspective, the Agreement can be analyzed (1) prior to its accession ratification, and (2) after its subsequent entry into force. The former concerns national legislation and the steps necessary for a document to enter into force. The latter deals with the concerned party’s prior or active international obligations and the possibility of eliminating collisions between such obligations.
Armenian legislation requires “ex ante” constitutional control for any treaty subject to ratification. Accordingly, Article XV potentially contains several unconstitutional provisions. Of main concern, Article 63 of the Armenian Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial. Presently, inter-state proceedings are ongoing in both the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) and the European Court of Human Rights (“EC(t)HR”) over the conflict. Mutual withdrawal, or dismissal of all interstate claims, will also affect cases at these international courts, limiting or even leveling out the possible legal protection of hundreds, maybe thousands, of people who rely on the interstate cases as a last resort. The question of subsequent individual application (in cases of state withdrawal) is vague and depends on EC(t)HR’s decision on admissibility, as deadlines for filing individual complaints have long expired.
The Two Key Clauses
Articles XIV and XV create a timing and scope conflict. Article XIV establishes a six-month consultation track for disputes about the Agreement’s interpretation or application, while Article XV requires a one-month obligation to withdraw from (and refrain from joining) interstate proceedings concerning “issues that existed before” the agreement’s execution. Many prior disputes continue to produce legal consequences afterward (e.g., continuing breaches or ongoing duties to cooperate). Consider the continuing effects (ILC ARSIWA Article 14(2)) of the September-October 2023 displacement of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in ethnic cleansing of Armenians from the entire region. Baku could characterize the “issue” as pre-existing under a broad reading of Article XV. Yerevan would have to withdraw or abstain within 30 days before XIV’s consultations can run their course, narrowing the peaceful-settlement avenue Article XIV presupposes. This is a standard diplomatic boilerplate provision; a nod to the UN Charter’s Article 33 list of peaceful means. Thus, the provisions require a narrow, effects-sensitive reading of Article XV of The Agreement, excluding continuing violations and treaty-mandated cooperation, so that XV does not unintentionally pre-empt XIV’s mechanism.
According to UN estimates, over 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forced to abandon their homes at gunpoint in 2023 amid Azerbaijan’s military offensive. Misclassifying mass displacement as a “past dispute” could shield ongoing violations from review and weaken civilian access to international remedies. | © WHO/Nazik Armenakyan
Under the ECHR, states (inter se) may not use settlements or amnesties to secure impunity for grave ill-treatment or killings. Further, they must not hinder the right of petition or withhold cooperation with the Court’s processes (Marguš v Croatia (GC) paras 139-41). Comparative experience leads to the same conclusion. The Inter-American Court in Barrios Altos (paras 41-44) declared blanket amnesties for grave abuses incompatible and without legal effect. In Europe, the Dayton settlement meshed peace with remedies by preserving access to international review (the Human Rights Chamber and, later, the ECtHR), illustrating that peace clauses often endure alongside substitute or parallel forums, rather than through blanket waivers. The ECtHR’s later jurisprudence (e.g., Sejdić and Finci, paras 48-50) confirmed that Convention-level obligations remained fully justiciable.
Elsewhere, parties paired “legal peace” with substitute institutions. Under the Algiers Agreement (12 Dec 2000), Eritrea and Ethiopia created the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission (“EECC”) to adjudicate state and national claims “for loss, damage or injury… related to the conflict;” applying international law, including International Humanitarian Law (IHL), with binding awards administered from The Hague (Article 5; Annex).
Similarly, Colombia’s Final Agreement (2016) established a Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition, including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace to investigate and sanction serious crimes (Section 5), while excluding genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious war crimes from any amnesty (Amnesty Law 1820/2016, Articles 23-24).
If Article XV is retained, the Parties should clarify that “issues that existed before” refers only to completed disputes, and does not extend to continuing or systemic violations. This clarification could be provided, for example, by interpretative declarations made at the time of signature.
The Problem of Ongoing Violations
One of the most challenging inquiries the future Agreement leaves unresolved is what happens to continuing breaches under international law. Can they be dismissed as “past disputes” simply because they predate The Agreement?
This does not present a conflict of treaties or an impossibility under international law. There is nothing in the ICJ Statute, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), or other binding instruments that makes it per se unlawful for Armenia and Azerbaijan to agree on the withdrawal of pending proceedings. However, translating Article XV into legal reality is procedurally and substantively complex.
Under the ICJ’s Rules of Court, once the Court has seized a case, discontinuance is only automatic if both parties agree or if the respondent does not object within the prescribed time limit (Art. 88(2)). If the respondent objects, the case continues. Similarly, under CERD, the inter-state complaint procedure in Articles 11-13 and 22 requires that once a dispute has been initiated, the respondent State is obligated to provide a written explanation within three months, and both parties must participate in good faith until the procedure concludes. Unilateral withdrawal would frustrate these treaty-based obligations.
If no settlement is reached, an ad hoc Conciliation Commission must be established to examine the dispute. The Commission must then prepare a report with recommendations, which both parties must consider in good faith. Further, unsettled disputes can be referred to the ICJ, unless the parties agree to another mode of dispute settlement. This provision is the legal basis for the ongoing proceedings before the ICJ.
Article XV is not an unlawful clause, nor an irreconcilable treaty conflict. However, its execution demands meticulous, coordinated action by both states across multiple legal forums.
Third Party Support
Article XV also forbids either state from being “involved in any manner” in third-party-initiated proceedings because such involvement often aligns with obligations under multilateral treaties. For example, CERD envisages compulsory inter‑state mechanisms and access to the ICJ. A sweeping “no-involvement” clause could conflict with these treaty duties, particularly regarding factual cooperation or procedural participation.
The clash becomes more pronounced under the ECHR. Article 38 obliges states to furnish “all necessary facilities” to the European Court. In Janowiec and Others v. Russia, the Court found a violation of Article 38 because Russia refused to provide a classified investigative file, which was deemed necessary for a proper examination (paras 103-111).
An overly expansive interpretation of Article XV, treating even neutral or mandatory cooperation as “involvement,” could place states in an untenable legal conflict. On one hand, the state must comply with the Agreement; on the other, it must honor established treaty responsibilities.
Is Lex Posterior Rule Applicable?
Another question is the applicability of the lex posterior rule to obligations assumed by both states under international conventions. Treaties such as CERD or the Genocide Convention, which include compromissory clauses, are relevant when dealing with Article XV. Whether the lex posterior rule applies here is a complex matter. Even if disputes concern solely Armenia and Azerbaijan, other state parties to multilateral conventions may retain a legal interest in ensuring the uniform application of those conventions.
An additional aspect concerns the application of peremptory norms, which give rise to erga omnes (owed to the international community as a whole) obligations. A bilateral treaty cannot override the right of states under Article 9 of the Genocide Convention. Even though Article XV does not expressly provide exceptions, the later law is unlikely to apply if either of the two states decides to appeal before the ICJ under a compromissory clause.
Conclusion
The Agreement is politically compelling but not legally self-executing. Disputes that began prior to signing, yet persist, are continuing breaches. They cannot be re-labelled as “past” disputes without misdescribing the law, and they remain justiciable under Article XIV. Once seized, international bodies maintain control, ICJ discontinuance hinges on respondent consent, CERD procedures presuppose engagement to completion, and ECHR cooperation duties are independent. The ban on “involvement” cannot lawfully curtail treaty-mandated cooperation or operate inter se as a lex posterior against multilateral regimes.
Accordingly, only a narrow reading of “issues [that] existed before,” plus implied carve-outs for continuing violations and mandatory cooperation, as well as sequenced withdrawals tied to compliance, keeps The Agreement legally stable. Anything broader would likely be construed narrowly or contrary to procedural and substantive obligations, with no preclusive effect on continuing claims.
Davit Khachatryan is an international law expert and lecturer specializing in public international law, alternative dispute resolution, investment law, international humanitarian law, and security.
Narek Abgaryan is a legal professional specializing in public international law with expertise in international humanitarian law and the law of international treaties, currently serving as the president of the Armenian International Law Association (AILA).