For nearly three years, the Eastern European nation of Ukraine has been entangled in a war it did not instigate, did not desire, but was forced into by its more powerful neighbor, Russia. Since the onset of the war, Russia has faced accusations of widespread atrocities, including severe violations of human rights, international humanitarian law, and breaches of other international norms. Following the inauguration of United States (US) President Donald Trump, there has been a renewed effort to bring both parties to the negotiating table and end the conflict. With the ongoing negotiations, there is no better time to investigate and place Russia’s actions in the correct legal context regarding this war than now. Thus, this article examines Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent conflict. The article’s analysis is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on a contextual analysis of the concept of “Novorossiya” and how this centuries-old idea was revived by Russia to rally ethnic Russians in Ukraine in support of its invasion. The second part conducts an extensive legal analysis of the invasion, concentrating on the legal framework governing the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2 (4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter and the scope of the right to self-defence under Article 51. In the context of these two doctrines, it reviews Russia’s justifications for invading Ukraine, specifically the claim of collective self-defence in support of the alleged Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. A key question the article addresses is whether Russia’s claim of collective self-defence and its assertion of protecting the Russian-speaking people of eastern Ukraine is legally sustainable in international law. It concludes that Russia’s actions constitute a clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty as well as territorial integrity and that its justification for using force lacks legal merit. Based on its analysis, the article concludes that there are sufficient grounds to pursue justice to uphold international law, maintain its credibility, and deter similar acts of aggression in the future.

The development of China’s anti-sexual harassment laws and policies over the past few decades has raised the hopes of many. However, the sheer volume of regulations can easily create the false impression that the Chinese legal system is effectively dealing with workplace sexual harassment. Statistics show that the number of lawsuits filed in Chinese courts remains trivial, even though workplace sexual harassment continues to be widespread. This article argues that courts in China misunderstand how to apply important concepts in litigation such as how to define sexual harassment and employer liability. The difficulty of carrying the burden of proof in workplace sexual harassment litigation also hinders legal remedies.  This article offers concrete proposals for advancing China’s ongoing legal reform on workplace sexual harassment law by reconceptualizing workplace sexual harassment, adopting fairer evidence rules, and firmly establishing an employer liability framework.

The meaning of citizenship in Malaysia is a tale as old as the country itself—a thorny triangular relationship between the state; the Bumiputera majority of Malay and indigenous natives; and the non-Bumiputeras minority of Chinese and Indians who primarily migrated when the region was under British colonial rule and influence. In the present, Bumiputeras enjoy a constitutionally stipulated special status—a distinction that bestows many privileges and preferential treatment in all facets of life, from commerce to education, homeownership to government employment, that is off-limits to non-Bumiputeras. Supporters of the system argue it remains necessary—a form of affirmative action to correct the economic disparity between the two groups that has largely persisted since Malaya gained its independence. Detractors contend it effectively creates two classes of citizenship while also breeding corruption. Malay nationalistic rhetoric claims it is an inviolable Social Contract, concocted in a grand bargain between Malay and non-Malay independence leaders in exchange for non-Malays gaining citizenship rights. What is less clear is the historical context that gave rise to these privileges and the views of Malaysia’s independence leadership on citizenship —in particular Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s first prime minister and founding father. This Article intends to shed light on the confluence of history, law, economics, society, and politics in the formation of Malaysia and analyze how these circumstances affected Tunku’s leadership and his approach toward reconciling the competing goals of delivering independence and uplifting Malays while simultaneously enfranchising non-Malays and making them feel included in the new state. Introspection here would show that Tunku struggled deeply on this account—his brand of communal politics pandered to Malay nationalists while convincing non-Malay leaders to recognize that Malays needed a special status to uplift themselves in return for citizenship rights and verbal promises to act on their interests. As time progressed, both sides felt Tunku was not doing enough for them, culminating in the election and riots of May 1969 that would force him out of power. However, without Tunku’s “moderate” guiding hand, his successors would use the foundation he laid to implement more aggressive affirmative action for Malays while also diminishing any legal and political space to question the special status of Malays—defining modern Malaysia’s relationship with Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera citizens.

China has been enacting data protection laws with distinctive features at an unprecedented pace, which makes it necessary to update existing studies on the Chinese approach to data protection. Unlike its predecessors, this Article focuses on developing a structured approach to dissecting the Chinese regime, especially the Personal Information Protection Law and latest case law. It analyzes how the laws allocate responsibilities among the three major parties involved in data protection—individual data subjects, data controllers, and regulators—and draws comparisons with European Union (EU) laws that inspired the Chinese laws. It argues that the way Chinese laws allocate data protection duties differs significantly from the EU laws. While individual consent, organizational obligations and state power are the three pillars of Chinese laws, state power takes precedence over the other two, especially when details of enforcement and the scope of state power remain unspecified. The Article proposes that future legislative efforts focus on two priorities: one is to provide more alternatives and exemptions to consent to make it less rigid, and the other is to clarify details of implementation so that the processors’ obligations become enforceable and state power will be constrained.

Despite Taiwan’s significant contributions to the global artificial intelligence (AI) ecosystem, its role remains underexamined in international AI governance discourse. This Article addresses this gap by analyzing Taiwan’s emerging AI regulatory framework, with particular emphasis on the Draft Basic Law on Artificial Intelligence (the “Draft AI Law”). Situating Taiwan’s approach within the broader global regulatory landscape, the Article compares the Draft AI Law with key international models, including the European Union’s AI Act and the United States’ NIST AI Risk Management Framework, while also drawing on regulatory developments in Japan and South Korea. Rather than providing a clause-by-clause analysis, the Article examines the structural and contextual factors shaping Taiwan’s AI regulation and identifies key uncertainties within the Draft AI Law, particularly regarding the governance of general-purpose AI (GPAI). Given the rapid evolution and uncertain risks of GPAI, the Article argues that adopting a centralized and rigid regulatory model, such as that of the European Union, may be premature for Taiwan. The Article proposes a hybrid regulatory framework that combines hard and soft law mechanisms, anchoring core principles such as risk management and transparency in legislation while allowing more technical and dynamic issues to be addressed through flexible, expert-driven processes. It further recommends a comprehensive assessment of GPAI prior to the implementation of binding regulations and suggests targeted revisions to the Draft AI Law to promote innovation while advancing trustworthy, ethical, and responsible AI governance.

On April 30th, 2025, the US-Ukraine Minerals Agreement is ambiguous in nature.While it may indeed evolve towards a contract or even a treaty, at present it is a political agreement, albeit one whereby the parties rely on the pertinent incentives to ensure compliance. This form of compliance, lacking normativity, is similar to the format of the Sustainable Development Goals and other political agreements. The agreement itself is contingent on a subsequent agreement, that has yet to be finalized and become public, which no doubt will possess a normative character. This latter agreement will serve as the articles of agreement of the investment fund envisaged in the April 30th agreement and which is to be incorporated as a limited liability partnership. The author argues that the agreement violates the internal economic/financial self-determination of the people of Ukraine. Consequently, even if the agreement were to somehow be characterized as a treaty or a contract, it was procured by successive bursts of coercion on the part of the U.S. and hence may be repudiated on such a ground. In equal measure, the proceeds that are meant to accrue to the USA may be viewed as an obligation giving rise to odious or illegal debt. The U.S.-Ukraine agreement, while stipulating its conformity with Ukraine’s obligations under other agreements with the EU, appears to conflict with those obligations.

Good governance and respect for democracy are at the forefront of the African Union’s (AU) legal and political purpose. International bodies and African conventions emphasize the need for democracy and good governance. Yet, in recent years, a wave of controversial constitutional amendments allowing presidents to concentrate political power by extending their terms in office (e.g. in Egypt, Algeria, Burundi, Chad, and Togo), either by allowing incumbent presidents to serve further consecutive terms or by extending the years they can serve in office, has underlined the need for AU intervention. These constitutional changes have been implemented through controversial referenda, often accompanied by violence, human rights violations, and contentious court rulings, while ruling parties and political elites have been accused of manipulating the results. These developments descend to an abuse of constitutionalism and are hardly compatible with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, or fundamental rights espoused by the AU and African regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The legitimacy of such constitutional changes, and by extension the president, is therefore open to serious questioning.

In 2023, the Seoul High Court made a ruling holding the State of Japan civilly liable for damages to South Korean women who had been subject to sexual slavery during World War II. This article will argue that under modern international law, the 2023 and 2021 court decisions made without the consent of the State of Japan are not enforceable due to a body of domestic and international law establishing the principle that sovereign immunity takes precedence over the prosecution of wartime crimes. Furthermore, this article will argue that these unilateral court decisions undermine the principles of good faith and cooperation that are the founding principles underpinning post-World War II institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Even with the overarching goal of achieving justice for wartime crimes, unilateral actions are a rejection of the modern consensus when it comes to international law, and if such actions become the norm, there is risk of a reversion to the pre-World War II international order––a world dominated by great power politics where peripheral powers like South Korea have lesser influence.

Justice Antonin Scalia once provocatively remarked that the Soviet Union “literally” had a “much better” Bill of Rights than the United States. Clarifying that the Soviet Bill of Rights had no meaning because the Soviet constitution did not prevent the centralization of power, Scalia argued that it was the structure of the United States—not the Bill of Rights—that made it exceptional in its freedom. His comments came at a time of increasing public frustration with legislative gridlock and the constitutional structure that caused it, prompting Scalia to come to its defense. As perceived threats to liberal democracy by rival models and internal transformations have received increasing attention, it is worth examining Scalia’s defense of the United States structure and the charge he levies at the Soviet constitution. Inversely, the philosophical underpinning of the Soviet project—Marxism—offers a significant critical perspective of the American tradition that Scalia defends. Indeed, the Marxist theory of law, ideology, and democracy can be wielded to simultaneously critique the constitutions of both the Soviet Union and the United States. By revealing the failures of Soviet centralization as well as the contradictions in Scalia’s view that constitutional barriers protect minorities, a Marxist analysis can equally sustain Scalia’s charge and turn it onto itself.

The personal data of insured individuals is the cornerstone of the insurance industry’s growth and stability worldwide, including in Vietnam. In the insurance market, personal data is the catalyst propelling expansion, streamlining premium payments, thwarting fraud, and enhancing contract management. From the insured individuals’ perspectives, however, protection of personal data and privacy is paramount. To extend protection to individuals’ digital privacy and facilitate the free flow of data, Vietnam recently adopted the Personal Data Protection Law (“PDPL”) in June 2025, after the country promulgated a national decree on the same subject in 2023. As a general law on personal data protection, the PDPL governs all sectors, including the insurance sector. This Article is the first to examine whether the PDPL and Vietnam’s insurance sector align. Based on informal interviews with key stakeholders, this Article sheds light on the challenges Vietnam’s insurance businesses encounter when complying with the PDPL. The Article proposes strategic solutions to assist enterprises in both complying with the law and fueling new growth in Vietnam’s burgeoning insurance market.

In Vietnam, science and technology are utilized to digitize all medical information nationwide. Digital transformation provides various benefits for individuals, including comprehensive health protection and care. Despite the benefits, challenges remain in ensuring the security of personal medical data and network safety. Since the enactment of the law on medical examination and treatment in 2023, Vietnam has continued to use amendments to keep up with patients’ rights initiatives. Notably, the issuance of the Decree on Personal Data Protection and the Law on Personal Data Protection 2025, No. 91/2025/QH15, passed by the National Assembly on June 26, 2025, and set to take effect on January 1, 2026. The latter marks a significant step forward in data protection legislation, specifically the security of patients’ personal data. Nevertheless, Vietnam has yet to carry out a comprehensive study evaluating its legal framework for personal data protection within the healthcare sector. This study examines patients’ rights regarding data privacy among healthcare practitioners and facilities, highlighting current challenges in Vietnamese law by analyzing specific healthcare regulations alongside general civil law principles. The findings highlight critical gaps within Vietnam’s current legal framework that must be addressed to strengthen the protection of patients’ rights, an essential component of a patient-centered healthcare system and a foundational pillar for achieving equitable and sustainable development in the health sector.

Vietnam has a burgeoning banking sector, which is developing rapidly towards digital transformation. Despite impressive achievements in adopting emerging digital technologies to promote financial inclusivity and enhance customer experience, the banking industry in Vietnam is facing data privacy issues from both technological and legal aspects. On one hand, the laws are overly rigid, causing difficulty and excessive costs related to compliance. On the other hand, weak enforcement of data privacy laws leads to customer grievances and undermines trust in digital banking. This Article explores the current legal framework for data privacy protection in Vietnam’s banking sector. The paper reveals that although a legal framework for data privacy is already in place, the banking sector in Vietnam faces numerous compliance challenges. Meanwhile, banking data leakage is pervasive and blatant, and banks in Vietnam face potential damages awards for breaching their confidentiality duties. This paper advocates for improvement of data privacy laws in Vietnam to promote innovation in the banking sector, taking into account the unique features of banking activities.