The Board of Peace: Creeping Toward a Privatized International Law

Trump attends the BoP Charter announcement and signing ceremony at the World Economic Forum, 22 January 2026

Stephen Fisher | April 5, 2026

There are still many questions about Donald Trump’s newest addition to international governance, the Board of Peace (BoP). The BoP was initially welcomed by the international community and established as a “transitional administration” for Gaza and the Palestinian people during their post-conflict redevelopment. Its inaugural meeting, however, indicated that the intentions of the BoP are much broader and longer lasting than the original proposal suggested. The breadth of power entrusted to the chairperson was striking, and the position’s first holder is unsurprisingly, Donald Trump. As such, the BoP reflects a move toward personalized governance, where international commitments are shaped not by multilateral frameworks, but leader-driven and resource-driven institutions.

What is the Board of Peace?

In November of 2025, the United Nations Security Council, the UN organ responsible for advancing international peace, adopted Resolution 2803. This resolution grants legitimacy to the BoP, welcomed its oversight of the reconstruction and peace process in Gaza, and encouraged UN member states and other international organizations to cooperate with the BoP. While largely supportive of the BoP, the UN resolution also limited the BoP’s authorization to the end of 2027.

The BoP Charter was ratified by founding members on January 22, 2026, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Within its first month, 27 countries have accepted invitations to join the BoP. The Charter declares that peace requires “common-sense solutions,” that the BoP will function in accordance with international law, and lays out the procedures to be followed by the BoP. To join, member states are invited by the chairperson for a three-year term, subject to renewal, as per article 2 of the Charter. Alternatively, member states can also opt to purchase a life-time term with a $1 billion USD contribution within the first year of the Charter’s ratification. Purchase of a membership, however, does not protect their membership from potential unilateral termination by the chairperson.

The Charter outlines the leadership structure of the BoP and highlights the plenary power of the chairperson, who is granted the exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve subsidiary entities, veto executive board decisions, and freely designate their own successor. Interestingly, the chairperson, unlike the representatives of regular members of the BoP, is not limited to heads of states or government officials. Additionally, the successor can only take over when the chairperson voluntarily resigns or is incapacitated, which is determined by a unanimous vote of the BoP’s executive board.

The inaugural meeting of the BoP took place on February 19, 2026, and while the meeting focused on the Middle Eastern conflict, it also hinted at President Trump’s intentions of the BoP being more than simply a “transitional administration.” During the meeting, Trump signaled his long-term vision for the BoP while also confronting the UN stating, “someday I won’t be here . . . the BoP is going to almost be looking over the United Nations and making sure it runs properly.”

The World’s Response

Comparing the BoP Charter to the current preeminent standard of international peace building, the UN, a few major differences immediately stand out. The UN Charter has 111 articles, compared to the BoP’s 13, and provides far more guidance on the organization’s purpose and accepted procedures. The UN Charter emphasizes more inclusive and cooperative decision-making processes and does not require a leading chairperson to invite prospective members. It also limits the authority of any given member state.

Maria del Mar Logrono Narbona, Vice-Chair of the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development, notes that the BoP represents a shift from multilateralism to managerialism styled governance in international law. In her op-ed, Nardona argues that the BoP subverts the UN and creates a pay-to-play system for world peace. She further contends that it wrongfully attributes past failures of international law to managerial skill gaps rather than to complex political realities that often lack easy solutions. The BoP’s legal basis has also been called into question. Sanmay Moitra compares the BoP against the three generally accepted criteria required for international organizations: (1) a constituent instrument which establishes its existence, (2) the capacity to express an autonomous will distinct to its members’ collective will (volonté distincte), and (3) its members’ capacity to enter international relations. He notes it is unclear whether the BoP claims legitimate establishment through UN Resolution 2803 or its own Charter. More importantly, however, the broad powers vested in a single individual make it difficult to attribute a true volonté distincte to the BoP.

Several United States allies remain skeptical, who raised questions about the BoP’s legitimacy and effectiveness. Countries such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom all have declined their invitations to join the BoP, citing concerns over its structure and negative implications for norms of international law. The countries’ rejections have not been taken well by President Trump, who floated the idea of imposing tariffs on French wines and champagnes in apparent retaliation. In a similar vein, Trump also rescinded Canada’s invitation after Prime Minister Carney’s Davos speech, where Carney urged smaller nations to resist efforts to dismantle international order. These incidents underscore the disruption that the BoP’s personality-driven and transactional approach is inflicting on international governance. The BoP leaves both participating and non-participating states navigating an increasingly uncertain international framework.

Personalizing International Law

The BoP reflects how President Trump is extending his leadership style into the international arena. In Davos, he remarked, “sometimes, you need a dictator,” a statement made in regards to a domestic issue and one that he qualified as rhetorical. Still, the timing and tone of this statement resonates with the BoP’s structure, centralized authority, plenary control over membership, and long-term influence beyond conventional multilateral norms. The structure of the BoP gives its chairperson extraordinary control over the direction of international law and “peacebuilding,” far beyond what traditional institutions have allowed.

The lack of formal limitations on who can serve as chairperson compounds the risk. In theory, the current design of the Charter enables Trump to maintain large scale international influence after his presidency, and even his passing. Trump could establish a Trump-aligned dynasty in international governance by selecting family members as his successors. A grimmer alternative, but theoretically possible, is Trump selecting the next chairpersonship based on the highest bid without any consideration of experience or commitment to peacebuilding. The BoP represents a radical experiment that risks becoming a mechanism for personalized, privatized, and purchased control over world peace.