Abebew Sisay Alemnow | April 21, 2026
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as the constitution for ocean governance and is the most comprehensive international legal instrument enshrining the rights and obligations of landlocked and coastal states. The maritime rivalry between landlocked and coastal nations remains a source of serious geopolitical tension. The manner in which landlocked states access the sea is a significant issue. While UNCLOS recognizes that countries without coastlines require access to the sea to participate in global trade, coastal states maintain sovereignty over the transit territory. This creates a structural geopolitical tension where the economic survival of one state depends on the political cooperation of another.
For instance, in 2013 Bolivia instituted proceedings against Chile to gain secure sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean after its diplomatic negotiations with Chile had failed. Subsequently, in October 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) settled the dispute, ruling that Chile has no international obligation to provide sovereign access for Bolivia to the Pacific Ocean. Some authorities cite the ICJ ruling in Bolivia v. Chile to reinforce the argument that landlocked states may only access the sea through bilateral or multilateral arrangements with coastal states. However, when properly understood, the ruling does not endorse the argument that landlocked states and coastal states must reach an arrangement to exercise rights vested for landlocked states.
The Historical Genesis of Bolivia v. Chile and the ICJ Ruling
The conflict between Bolivia and Chile originates from The War of the Pacific, a war that pitted Bolivia and Peru on one side against Chile on the other, and redrew the boundaries between states in Latin America. The War of the Pacific began due to Bolivia’s intention to increase taxes on the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company, a Chilean-owned business. Chile perceived this tax increase as a violation of an agreement signed between the two states in 1874. When Bolivia moved to seize the property of the company, Chile officially declared war on Bolivia in 1879.
In 1904, Bolivia and Chile signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which ended the war between them. Prior to this treaty, Bolivia possessed hundreds of kilometers of coastline on the Pacific Ocean. After the treaty was ratified, Bolivia ceded the territory and no longer had sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, only retaining commercial transit rights, which rendered the nation landlocked. As a result, Bolivia initiated negotiations with Chilean authorities to regain its presence on the Pacific coast for several decades. However, the negotiations conducted were unfruitful and did not fulfill Bolivia’s aspirations regarding access to the Pacific Ocean. In 2011, Bolivian President Evo Morales issued a pivotal diplomatic declaration regarding the nation’s maritime aspirations. He asserted that should bilateral negotiations fail to yield a sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean, Bolivia would be compelled to seek judicial redress before international courts. Chile’s Foreign Minister, Alfredo Moreno, emphasized that “Chile is not in a position to grant Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.” Chile’s rejection of Bolivia’s claim lead Bolivia to bring the issue before the ICJ in 2013.
During the proceedings, Bolivia invoked several decades of diplomatic negotiations with Chile, unilateral statements by Chilean governmental authorities regar, and binding international legal instruments to legitimize its claim before the court. Chile rejected Bolivia’s argument, contending that unilateral statements of its governmental authorities were mere expressions of willingness to negotiate with Bolivia. Bolivia’s legal strategy was predicated on the impression that its historical interactions with Chile had crystallized into a binding commitment. Under international law, agreements are not necessarily required to be in writing to create a binding obligation on a state. Unilateral statements made orally can create binding international obligations. The essential criteria to create an international obligation is the clear intention of the parties to be bound by their commitment. The Court rejected Bolivia’s claim, ruling that Chile is under no international obligation to negotiate with Bolivia to grant sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. The Court held that unilateral statements and political discussions between the two states did not truly manifest an intention by Chile to be legally bound to negotiate.
Bolivia v. Chile is inapplicable to the Statutory Interpretation of UNCLOS Article 125
Article 125 of the UNCLOS, establishes that landlocked states shall have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy the freedom of transit through coastal states. The provision further specifies that such transit shall be exempt from any customs duties. Coastal states, however, retain their sovereignty to ensure that the transit and access rights of landlocked states do not jeopardize their national and legitimate interests. While the Convention entitles Landlocked States to this right, the manner in which they exercise it remains a subject of debate in international legal scholarship. This disagreement stems from the interpretation of Article 125(1) and (2) of the Convention. Those who invoke Article 125(1) argue that the use of the term “shall” implies that Landlocked States have an unconditional, legitimate right to access the sea, and coastal states have a corresponding obligation to allow these states to invoke the rights entitled by the Convention.
Conversely, some legal scholarship posits a restrictive interpretation of the UNCLOS, asserting that the substantive right of access enshrined in Article 125(1) is contingent upon the procedural requirement of Article 125(2). Article 125(2) of UNCLOS stipulates that land-locked and transit states must enter into bilateral, sub-regional, or regional agreements as a procedural requirement to exercise the right of freedom of transit. Thus, proponents of this view argue for a cumulative construction, suggesting that the “right of access” remains inchoate until the “terms and modalities” are codified through bilateral or regional agreements. To bolster this position, critics cite Bolivia v. Chile to argue that international law does not impose a self-executing obligation on coastal states to grant access without a prior accord. However, the ruling in Bolivia v. Chile cannot be utilized to dilute the normative weight of Article 125 for three reasons.
These are Categorically Distinct Legal Assertions
First, the legal grounds for the decision in Bolivia v. Chile must be distinguished from the broader jurisprudential framework of the UNCLOS. The ICJ’s adjudication focused exclusively on a sovereign quest, a claim for the transfer of territorial jurisdiction to establish a sovereign corridor. In contrast, the Right of Access and Freedom of Transit under article 125 of UNCLOS are functional entitlements. While the former seeks sovereign control over a coastal strip, the latter seeks functional use of existing infrastructure for maritime commerce.
The Convention entitles landlocked states to transit rights alone, subject to arrangements made with coastal states. In Bolivia v. Chile, Bolivia attempted to invoke sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, a right not recognized under the Convention. However, when landlocked states attempt to invoke transit rights, which is a right recognized under the Convention, the case has no precedential value for interpreting Article 125 rights. Article 125 governs functional transit, a treaty-based right that coastal states are obligated to facilitate in good faith. Article 300 of the UNCLOS imposes an obligation on all states to exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations in good faith. Any attempt to weaponize Bolivia v. Chile against landlocked states asserting their transit right constitutes an erroneous reading of the case as a well as a violation of Article 125. Ignoring that distinction results in a violation of Article 300.
The Jurisdictional and Doctrinal Autonomy of the Claims
Second, Bolivia’s pleadings were notably not grounded from the statutory framework of the UNCLOS. Instead, its argument was predicated upon the doctrine of unilateral acts, as it asserted that successive Chilean administrations created a binding obligation to negotiate through decades of diplomatic correspondence and political overtures. The arguments presented before the Court concentrated on the principles of acquiescence and estoppel equitable doctrines used to hold a state to its previous representations. Crucially, Bolivia did not invoke Article 125 of the UNCLOS as the gravamen of its argument. Because UNCLOS was not the legal basis of the claim and the Court was tasked only with determining whether an “obligation to negotiate” existed, the Court had no reason to interpret Article 125. Consequently, the judgment does not interpret or define the legal requirements of Article 125.
The Subjective Nature of Legal Claims
Lastly, the impact of the Bolivia v. Chile decision must be measured against the specific legal, historical, and demographic justifications unique to each claimant state. Each landlocked state invokes its own distinct legal and historical arguments to legitimize its quest for access to the sea. For instance, Ethiopia’s current quest for sea access is predicated upon historical claims and demographic necessity that differ fundamentally from the “obligation to negotiate” argued by Bolivia. Therefore, Article 125 remains a dynamic provision that must be interpreted in light of the specific legal and historical arguments invoked by landlocked states. Consequently, as the ICJ ruling served as a resolution to a specific territorial dispute rather than a universal restrictive precedent, it cannot be used to broadly limit the transit rights of other landlocked nations.
Conclusion
The ICJ’s refusal to compel Chile to negotiate a sovereign corridor cannot be extrapolated to support the claim that Landlocked States possess no rights in the absence of a specific arrangement based on the following justifications. The ruling addresses a specific demand for territorial sovereignty, a claim outside the scope of UNCLOS rather than the functional transit rights enshrined in Article 125. Because the decision was predicated on unilateral acts rather than statutory interpretation, it does not diminish the treaty-based obligations of coastal states to facilitate sea access in good faith. Ultimately, this judgment is a narrow resolution of a unique historical grievance; it lacks the legal weight to supersede the universal transit rights of landlocked states.