By Sanya D. Kishwar, Naman Vijaywargi, and Alfia Sarwar Ali | October 15, 2025

Introduction

Climate, but more importantly in today’s context, climate change, has seldom been restricted or bound within national borders. Increasing temperatures, the warming of the oceans along with destruction of entirely fragile ecosystems affect all countries, albeit with some more at risk than others. Asia, and particularly South Asia stands out as one such example. Himalayan glacier melts, heatwaves, droughts, depleting groundwater reserves, and increasing levels of air pollution juxtaposed with an ever-increasing population burden puts the region at a crucial juncture, with sustainability, development and adaptation all angling for space and priority. 

While it is easy to consider all countries in isolation, the unique modern history and geography of South Asia means that nearly all countries will be affected. Rivers such as the Indus, Ganga, and Brahmaputra are transboundary Himalayan rivers. Thus, decisions taken by countries upstream affect the fates of the millions who live near the discharge mouths and basins of the rivers along with cases of extreme monsoons causing large scale flooding. Unlike the Water Framework Directive, International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, or even the Mekong Framework, the Himalayan rivers do not have a combined transnational law or agreement that governs their resources and stipulates usage for consumption in a sustainable manner. Individual treaties between the countries, like the Indus Waters Treaty, which is currently in abeyance, have mitigated some issues but larger questions entailing larger climate law as well as community-led sustainable development are far from being answered. 

This trust deficit between Himalayan nations has led to environmental security being subject to unilateral action by countries upstream, leaving millions of lives at risk. The most illustrative example here is the Tsang Po (referred to as the Brahmaputra in India), crossing 3 countries from its origin in Tibet all the way to the Sundarbans, sustaining a population of 100 million. China’s recent announcement of a hydropower project on the river, part of its newly revealed Five Year Plan has heightened scrutiny in India, who noted the dam’s extreme volume could be used to cut off water supply and cause droughts in its northeastern region. In a water stressed region heavily dependent on monsoons, millions could be negatively affected by decisions taken upstream. Bangladesh, which hosts one of the largest river basins on the planet, will be particularly affected as the Ganga and Brahmaputra passes through India and China before reaching the country, exacerbating both flooding and drought risks depending on the monsoon that year. Nepal and Bhutan face mounting risks from glacial melt as well as lake bursts, and Sri Lanka is under constant stress from cyclones and storm surges. In conjunction, these occurrences portray a stark picture that South Asia is among the most climate affected regions yet has regularly demonstrated a lack of institutional preparedness, whether through law or policy to mitigate its effects. 

Despite the catastrophic effects of ecological disasters, co-operation mechanisms have almost all stalled. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (‘SAARC’) had long ago established an Action Plan on Climate Change and created a unified Disaster Management Centre, but geopolitical concerns have stalled the effective functioning and progress of the Plan. In such an impasse, international law offers a potential path out of the deadlock, with transnationally valid instruments such as the UN Watercourses Convention, the Helsinki Rules on the uses of the waters of international rivers by the International Law Association, and the Paris Agreement all stressing equitable use principles and shared adaptation responsibility. However, not all the South Asian states have ratified such international treaties and agreements, essentially reducing them to mere paper tigers when it comes to implementation in the region. Aside from India and Bangladesh who have the Ganges Treaty, South Asia has not translated and adapted such mechanisms, and without a regional watershed agreement, the entire ecosystem remains under threat. 

Geopolitics is inevitable and to a certain extent a necessary evil, however, environmental stress is only going to increase across the globe, and South Asia is no exception. Therefore, bridging the existing gap between legal framework and their implementation requires more than regional co-operation. There is an inevitable requirement for a regional foreign policy wrapped in climate resilience and backed by a legal framework to build a shared future. 

Regional Co-operation under International Law

While it does not exist currently, regional co-operation serves as the biggest tool which can protect vulnerable populations of the SAARC region from the continual challenges of climate change. The legal building blocks, encompassing nearly every country, already exist and provide a framework of diplomacy and co-operation. Preeminently, the Paris Agreement of 2015 presents a collective obligation towards the mitigation of climate change, particularly Article 7, which recognizes climate change related adaptation as a goal that requires imminent global co-operation. Similarly, the Watercourses Convention and the Helsinki Rules posit the principles of equitable, justifiable and conscientious utilization of transboundary rivers, emphasizing no “significant harm” to the resources utilized by other states. A framework inspired by accords and conventions codified under customary international law could serve as the basis for South Asia’s shared riverine systems and basins. Further, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, endorsed by all 193 member states of the United Nations, specifically provided for anticipatory, risk-based planning that can effectively integrate deployment of renewables into regional security planning, the kind that SAARC sorely needs. Looking at it from a macro level, combined with SAARC’s and the Disaster Management Centre’s own Action Plans, the scaffolding to support such an arrangement exists while its operationalization is currently lacking.

Comparatively stable SAARC member states, such as India, could serve as bulwarks of a renewed regional climate security through foreign policy and regional cooperation. India’s leadership of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) with France was seen as a potential move to enhance its own solar capabilities, while assisting developing countries in enhancing their grids by augmenting household solar installations with national grids. India committed to 500GW of renewable energy by 2030, and as of 2024 had already installed more than 200GW, amounting to nearly half of its total energy production. India’s commitment and subsequent strides to ensure it meets its climate goals positions it well to be a leader of the Global South in enhancing renewable energy mixes, and pushing for climate resilience as part of a greater global policy. 

China, although not a SAARC member, added nearly 350GW of renewable capacity in 2023 and controls nearly 80% of global photovoltaic production, making its supply lines crucial to the regional and larger global effort. Even as a non-SAARC member, China’s upstream decisions on the Brahmaputra will dramatically affect India and Bangladesh, making the country integral to any larger regional framework. A cooperative framework would seek to learn, adapt, and augment from both India’s policy and China’s industrial throughput, seeing them as complementary innovations. Both would also fall squarely between the SAARC and ISA frameworks. 

Such a regional co-operative design would seek to be embedded under already existing protocols of international law and treaties, namely, Article 9 of the Watercourses Convention, which requires states to share hydrological data. India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Pakistan could model and adopt a SAARC protocol for similar data sharing provisions, requiring upstream and downstream flows efficiency on the Ganga, Brahmaputra and Indus’s flows. While not a failsafe, especially if a country decides to ultimately disregard its obligations under the treaty, it would constrain unilateral dam building risks. Furthermore, a proposed treaty could be modeled on the ECOWAS Renewable Policy of West Africa, which has shown considerable impact on electricity availability in the Sahel States providing millions in a war-torn region with reliable supply of power. A similar framework could be adopted in a legally binding format for the SAARC states, including a binding renewable energy target, particularly helping Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh access reliable energy supplies. 

Conclusion

In totality, it is optimal to integrate a proposed framework with United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (‘SDG’), specifically, goals 6 (clean water and sanitation), 7 (affordable and clean energy) and 13 (climate action). It is important to implement this proposed framework through a regional accord to provide normative legitimacy. Additionally, to facilitate implementation, regional funding could be sought for energy and climate resilience projects. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or the International Monetary Fund could be involved in the funding process through regional arrangements. Further expanding the scope of bilateral power agreements, such as those between India and Bhutan and the proposed collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan, to cover the region would allow for cross–border infrastructure funding as well as compliance. Operationalizing this agreement under the SAARC framework would give the treaties force of law under international safeguards as well as ensuring predictability. It is of utmost necessity that such an agreement is realized so as to facilitate the region’s adaptation to climate change and resultant crises.

Sanya D. Kishwar is an Assistant Professor at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University and a Doctoral Candidate at National Law University, Delhi. Her area of research spans across feminist theories, human rights and environmental law. 

Naman Vijaywargi is a recent public policy graduate from King’s College, London with a sustained focus on the intersection of international law, trade and strategic research.

Alfia Sarwar Ali is a penultimate student at the Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.